


IEEE Software Taggant System in Action

Igor Muttik, McAfee Labs
Mark Kennedy, Symantec

“A **taggant** is a chemical or physical marker added to materials to allow various forms of testing. Taggants allow testing marked items for qualities such as lot number and concentration (to test for dilution, for example). In particular, taggants are known to be widely used in plastic, sheet and flexible explosives.”



<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taggant>

Problem of packed malware

- At least 50% of malware is packed and a big headache for AV companies
- A major source of server-side polymorphics common in the Internet




- Would it not be nice to remove this source of malware?

Benefits of the system

- Security Vendors
 - More proactive protection
 - Less false positives and slowdowns
 - Less resources wasted
- Software Packer Vendors
 - Less false positives
 - Enforcing of licensing, less piracy, higher returns
 - One point of contact with security industry
 - SPV are now part of the solution
 - Competitive benefits
 - It is free
- Packer Users and End-Users
 - Less false positives and slowdowns
 - It is transparent and free (unlike digital signatures)
- We are hoping to solve the problem of packed malware in ~2-3 years



How the System Works



AV products block packed malware by recognizing bad sources (e.g. **compromised**)

IEEE root X.509 certificates

Generated at a key ceremony on 20 Sep 2012

Subject: IEEE Certificates

Attached: IEEE Root CA.509 (2 KB); IEEE CA.509 (2 KB)

view IEEE_Root_CA.509 - Far

E:\IEEE_Root_CA.509

```
0000000000: 30 82 05 E8 30 82 03 D0
0000000010: 04 3B 42 C4 91 A9 89 D5
0000000020: 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7
0000000030: 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04
0000000040: 42 06 03 55 04 0A 13 3E
0000000050: 69 74 75 74 65 20 6F 6E
0000000060: 63 61 6C 20 61 6E 64 2C
0000000070: 69 63 73 20 45 6E 67 69
0000000080: 6E 63 2E 31 0D 30 0B 06
0000000090: 45 45 31 15 30 13 06 03
00000000A0: 45 20 52 6F 6F 74 20 43
00000000B0: 39 32 30 30 30 30 30 3C
00000000C0: 31 39 32 33 35 39 35 39
00000000D0: 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53
00000000E0: 0A 13 3B 54 68 65 20 49
00000000F0: 20 6F 66 20 45 6C 65 63
0000000100: 6E 64 20 45 6C 65 63 74
0000000110: 6E 67 69 6E 65 65 72 73
0000000120: 30 0B 06 03 55 04 0B 13
0000000130: 13 06 03 55 04 03 13 0C
0000000140: 74 20 43 41 30 82 02 22
0000000150: F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 02
0000000160: 02 82 02 01 00 BA 60 0C
0000000170: AB C4 65 CD 66 36 A1 25
```

view IEEE_CA.509 - Far

E:\IEEE_CA.509

```
0000000000: 30 82 05 85 30 82 03 6D
0000000010: DB F1 3E DA F5 FE DA DD
0000000020: 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7
0000000030: 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04
0000000040: 42 06 03 55 04 0A 13 3B
0000000050: 69 74 75 74 65 20 6F 66
0000000060: 63 61 6C 20 61 6E 64 20
0000000070: 69 63 73 20 45 6E 67 69
0000000080: 6E 63 2E 31 0D 30 0B 06
0000000090: 45 45 31 15 30 13 06 03
00000000A0: 45 20 52 6F 6F 74 20 43
00000000B0: 39 32 30 30 30 30 30 3C
00000000C0: 31 39 32 33 35 39 35 39
00000000D0: 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53
00000000E0: 0A 13 3B 54 68 65 20 49
00000000F0: 20 6F 66 20 45 6C 65 63
0000000100: 6E 64 20 45 6C 65 63 74
0000000110: 6E 67 69 6E 65 65 72 73
0000000120: 30 0B 06 03 55 04 0B 13
0000000130: 0E 06 03 55 04 03 13 07
0000000140: 82 01 22 30 0D 06 09 2A
0000000150: 05 00 03 82 01 0F 00 30
0000000160: B3 EB F7 35 05 ED F3 B9
0000000170: 9E 34 88 4B 0E 03 AB 63
```

```
A0 03 02 01 02 02 10 5B 0é♣à0é♥má♥©©©©[
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0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 79 ♪♣*âHà ♪©©♣ Oy
06 13 02 55 53 31 44 30 1♠0♣♥U♦♣!!©US1D0
54 68 65 20 49 6E 73 74 B♣♥U♦♣!!;The Inst
20 45 6C 65 63 74 72 69 itute of Electri
45 6C 65 63 74 72 6F 6E cal and Electron
6E 65 65 72 73 2C 20 49 ics Engineers, I
03 55 04 0B 13 04 49 45 nc.1♠0♣♥U♦♣!!♦IE
55 04 03 13 0C 49 45 45 EE1§0!!♣♥U♦♥!!♀IEE
41 30 1E 17 0D 31 32 30 E Root CA0▲!♠120
30 5A 17 0D 33 32 30 39 920000000Z!♠3209
5A 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 19235959Z0t1♠0♣♥
31 44 30 42 06 03 55 04 ♥U♦♣!!©US1D0B♣♥U♦
6E 73 74 69 74 75 74 65 ♣!!;The Institute
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72 6F 6E 69 63 73 20 45 nd Electronics E
2C 20 49 6E 63 2E 31 0D ngineers, Inc.1♠
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49 45 45 45 20 43 41 30 ♪♣♥U♦♥!!•IEEE CA0
86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 é©"0♠*âHà ♪©©©
82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 ♣ ♥é©* Oé©©©é©©
18 B0 6A FE F3 D3 D7 B8 |U 5♣Y%| †||j♠ÉI©
5A 75 30 8D CE E4 E6 39 ×4èK 1♠%cZu0à♠lu9
```

Status of the project – **READY**

- The library based on Open SSL is ready, code reviewed and tested
 - API documentation is available
 - Includes a modified version of UPX which supports taggants

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- PKI servers by VeriSign/Symantec (support blacklisting and time-stamping)

Documentation is ready

1. The process of creating taggants for the SPV

- 1) Initialize the taggant library with the `TaggantInitializeLibrary` function;
- 2) Within the process of creating a protected file, the SPV must reserve some space in the file where the taggant will be placed. The size of the reserved space must be equal to constant `TAGGANTS_REQUIRED_LENGTH` from module `taggant_types.h`;
- 3) The SPV must go through the complete procedure of file protection. Please note that after the taggant is created, the SPV should no longer modify the protected file. Exceptions are file modifications upon its digital signature (with parameters `IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY` of the directory in the optional header changed) and if `HASHMAP` hashing is used upon taggant creation;
- 4) The SPV must place the necessary data to the file enter point according to the manual (relative jump `JMP 0x8` and 8-byte pointer to the location of taggants in a physical file);
- 5) Check user license by calling `TaggantGetLicenseExpirationDate` and optionally notify user about license expiration date;
- 6) Create a context for file reading handler functions by calling `TaggantContextNew`;
- 7) Create a `TAGGANTOBJ` helper object using the `TaggantObjectNew` function;
- 8) Call `TaggantComputeDefaultHashes` (or `TaggantAddHashRegion/TaggantComputeHashMap`) to calculate file hashes;
- 9) Fill out packer information structure with help of `TaggantPackerInfo` function;
- 10) Receive a response from the TSA server by calling the `TaggantPutTimestamp` function (optionally);
- 11) Create a taggant structure by calling `TaggantPrepare`. Write the taggants into the protected file;
- 12) Free the helper object `TAGGANTOBJ` using the `TaggantObjectFree` function;
- 13) Free the context by the `TaggantContextFree` function;
- 14) Free the taggant library resources using the `TaggantFinalizeLibrary` function.

2. The process of checking taggants for SSV

- 1) Initialize the taggant library with the `TaggantInitializeLibrary` function;
- 2) Create a context for file reading handler functions by calling `TaggantContextNew`;
- 3) Check if the file has a taggant structure and get it using the `TaggantGetTaggant` function;
- 4) Create a `TAGGANTOBJ` helper object using the `TaggantObjectNew` function;
- 5) Check the CMS digital signature in the taggant structure (i.e. check whether the CMS is signed with the certificate derived from the IEEE Root certificate or not) by calling the `TaggantValidateSignature` function. If the function returns an error, deem the taggant structure incorrect;
- 6) Optionally, check the TSA response contained in the taggant and get the time of file protection using the `TaggantGetTimestamp` function. If the function returns an error, deem the taggant structure does not contain timestamp;
- 7) Optionally, check the packer version with help of `TaggantPackerInfo` function;
- 8) Extract hash type from taggant using `TaggantGetHashType`;
- 9) Depending on a hash type, validate the hash of real file using `TaggantValidateDefaultHashes/TaggantValidateHashMap` functions;
- 10) Retrieve user and SPV certificates from taggants using the `TaggantGetInfo` function and check if they are not blacklisted;
- 11) Free the `TAGGANTOBJ` helper object using the `TaggantObjectFree` function;
- 12) Free the context using the `TaggantContextFree` function;
- 13) Free the taggant library resources using the `TaggantFinalizeLibrary` function.

Taggant_enabled_UPX(CALC.EXE)

The screenshot shows a hex editor window titled "Hiew: TEST_P~1.EXE" displaying the memory contents of "C:\drive_j\A\@l\v5\UPX\bin\TEST_P~1.EXE". The hex dump shows various byte sequences. A white box highlights the entry point "EB 08" at offset 00004CE0. A white box highlights a "64bit offset" of "EF 4C 00 00 00 00 00 00" at offset 00004CE4. A yellow box highlights the taggant structure "AGG" at offset 00004D20. A large yellow diagonal box contains the text "CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) block with the taggant structure (and timestamp)".

You will soon see packed files with taggants (**EB 08** at the entry point + **"TAGG"**)

Using the system

- If you:
 - Want to check the taggant validity
 - Want to use the taggant library to parse the taggant CMS structure
 - Want to check that the certificate is not blacklisted (packer installation is a valid packer customer)
 - Want to participate in blacklisting of packed malware sources




Summary

- The system is ready to go
- You will see packed files with taggants soon
- To be able to crack open, verify the CMS structure and check the black list you will need to licence the system




The End



1. The proceedings contain full API guide
2. <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/icsg>
3. https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Kennedy/BH_US_11_KennedyMuttik_IEEE_Slides.pdf

Questions, please



Backup slides

Taggant vs authenticode



- Taggant contains a “performant” hash (SHA256 by default)
 - Covers only vital executable areas
- Taggant allows a fall-back on to a “default” hash
 - It covers the whole file (almost whole)
 - Will be used if the performant hash is broken
- Creating and using files with taggants is **free**
 - Included by the packing software automatically
 - The PKI infrastructure will be sponsored by AV companies
- Taggants are compatible with authenticode
 - Digital signature can be applied after a packer included a taggant

The lifecycle

Step 1 – packer vendor

New packer vendor contacts IEEE

IEEE verifies the vendor

IEEE creates a vendor login

Vendor asks for a URL for a user

URL is embedded into the license for each user's packer setup

Packer user gets the packer setup

Step 2 – packer software setup

The setup logs into a unique URL

IEEE creates a key pair

Setup gets a certificate back

Step 3 – packer obfuscates a file

Packer is executed to pack a file

Taggant is created with 3 hashes

Timestamp is included

Setup/user certificate is included

Taggant is part of the packed file

Packed file is distributed

Step 4 – packed file executes

End user runs a packed file

AV checks the source (the setup certificate & maybe a timestamp)

AV blocks if bad